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1The Danish People’s Party 
and new cleavages in Danish politics 
Jørgen Goul Andersen
Department of Economics, Politics and Public Administration
Aalborg University
When the Danish People’s Party (DF) gained 12.0 per cent of the votes in the Danish 2001
election, it was brought from the margins to the mainstream of Danish politics. Until the time
of writing it has functioned (2001-03) not only as the parliamentary basis for the new Liberal-
Conservative government that was formed after the election, but also as the government’s
main coalition partner in day-to-day politics. This includes large reforms such as the reform
package in 2002 that lead to an unprecedented tightening of the conditions of immigrants and
immigration. Somewhat reluctantly, even the unions have from time to time practised regular
contacts with the party, for instance in order to avoid government regulation against closed
shop arrangements. This development since the 2001 election completes a transformation of
the new right in Denmark from neoliberal populism to a more centrist and - intentionally - less
populist battle against immigration and for other values.
This article describes the changing policy positions and analyse the electoral basis of
the new right alongside the transformation of the Danish cleavage structure. The first section
gives a short description of the history and election results of the Danish People’s Party and its
predecessor, the Progress Party. The next section presents an analytical model of cleavage
change and cleavage mobilisation underlying the analysis and discusses its relationship to
alternative theoretical frameworks for the analysis of new right parties. The third section focus
on the changing political agenda in Denmark in the 1990s, whereas the two following sections
analyse the changing electoral bases of the party and the policy position of its current
adherents. The penultimate section discusses the relationship between this analysis and
competing interpretations in terms of marginalisation. Finally, the concluding section also
discusses possible futures of the party. 
To present the main thesis briefly, it is argued that the ‘mainstreaming’ of the Danish
People’s Party reflects deep underlying changes in the cleavage structure which are rooted in
the process of globalisation and in the transformation from industrial society to
postindustrialism, but mobilised through the logic of party competition (see also Andersen &
Bjørklund, 1990; Bjørklund & Andersen, 2002). This also means that, as a point of departure,
support for DF should be analysed from the same perspective as any other party. This is also
one of the main reasons for choosing the neutral term “new right” rather than “extreme right”,
“radical right” or “populist right” as umbrella concept for the Danish People’s Party and its
predecessor, the Progress Party.
21. The premature birth and the metamorphosis of the new right in Denmark
The Danish new right was born in 1972 when the hitherto unknown tax lawyer Mogens
Glistrup launched his anti-tax Progress Party. Within a few months, the newly formed party
was elevated to more than 20 per cent support in opinion surveys, and in the December 1973
election, it won a landslide victory with 15.9 per cent of the votes (see table 1). 
[ table 1 goes here ]
The party originally represented a neoliberal populism (Andersen, 1992; Glans, 1975), with
abolition of all income tax as the main issue. Its ideology was almost anarcho-liberal as it
promised to abandon public regulation and welfare of all sorts. But it was a neoliberalism of
the lower strata as it would start by abolishing income taxes for the low incomes, and as it
promised higher budgets for old-age pensions and health care. Its style was populist in the
sense that it mobilised the people against the (corrupt) elites and claimed the will of the
people as “supreme over every other standard” (Shils, 1956), including legal standards
(Andersen, 1992). Counter-elitism was also manifest in the party’s demand for more
referenda.
From the beginning, the populist style of the party was at that time rather unique: The
party did not adhere to any nationalist or passionate style; rather, it successfully applied the
weapon of humour in getting attention, e.g. by Mogens Glistrup’s proposals to sell off
Greenland and the Faroe Islands to the highest bidder, and to abolish the Danish defence in
favour of an automatic telephone replier saying: We surrender. Within a few years, however, a
conflict developed between “tighteners” and “slackeners”, the latter adhering to a more
conventional style and seeking cooperation with other bourgeois parties. The “slackeners”
never managed to capture full control over the party, but proposals like the above-mentioned
disappeared, and the party increasingly took conventional bourgeois policy positions on many
issues.
The Progress Party maintained an electoral support well above 10 per cent in four
subsequent elections throughout the 1970's, but when the Conservatives and the Liberals
formulated a more radical and offensive bourgeois alternative, electoral support for the
Progress Party declined rapidly: To 8.9 per cent in the 1981 election and more dramatically to
3.6 per cent in 1984 - increasingly concentrated among die-hard neoliberals (Glans, 1984). At
the same time, Glistrup was imprisoned for tax fraud, and according to opinion polls, support
for the party reached the critical two per cent threshold of representation in early 1985. With a
convincing bourgeois alternative, inspired by the bourgeois revolutions of Reagan and
Thatcher, there seemed to be little space left for the Progress Party (Glans, 1984). It was
desperately in need for new issues and new leadership. But the first transformation of the
party was immediately to follow.
The opportunity for new leadership came when Glistrup was imprisoned and
declared unworthy to maintain his seat in parliament. Pia Kjaersgaard was called in to replace
3him in 1984, and before Glistrup was re-elected in 1987, she had managed to establish herself
as de facto leader of the party, certainly without any intention to give up this position. Unlike
Glistrup, Kjaersgaard wanted to make the party a “respectable” and reliable cooperation
partner for bourgeois parties. But at the same time, she became the exponent of the first
transformation of the party’s agenda from traditional left-right politics (taxes) to a new
conflict dimension, with immigration as rallying issue.
In fact, it was Glistrup who first sensed the possibility to mobilise on new issues.
Already towards the end of the 1970's, Glistrup had begun fraternising with xenophobic
groups inside and outside the party. But at that time it only served to generate internal unrest
and to alienate better-educated voters from the party. By 1979, the party’s voters still did not
deviate from other voters in attitudes towards immigrants (Bjørklund & Andersen, 2002), and
until the mid-1980's, emphasis on tax relief remained the distinguishing issue among the
party’s voters (Glans, 1984). 
However, when the number of asylum-seekers exploded from 800 in 1983 to 4.300 in
1984 and 8.700 in 1985 (Andersen & Bjørklund, 2000: 200), the time was ripe. On the very
day of his relief from prison, Glistrup made highly provocative statements about immigrants
which received considerable media coverage as they resembled statements by a local
representative of the party who had previously been sentenced for racism. In the following
years, Glistrup and Kjaersgaard had an odd cooperation in forming an “issue ownership” for
the party on the issue of immigration. Glistrup made one provocative statement after another,
gaining media attention, while Kjaersgaard softened the statements to make them more
socially acceptable. Although the party maintained its strong neoliberal ideas, immigration
replaced tax relief as the main rallying issue for the party. And as far as political style is
concerned, the spectacular statements and proposals of Mogens Glistrup was partly replaced
by the skillful application of “common sense” by Pia Kjaersgaard. 
Alongside mobilisation on increasing disappointment with the bourgeois
government, this rescued the party from extinction: The party gained 4.8 per cent in the 1987
election and 9.0 per cent in 1988. In the autumn of 1988, the party’s support even sky-
rocketed to some 17-18 per cent in opinion polls. But the party was ridden by increasing
internal conflicts culminating with the exit of Glistrup and three followers shortly before the
1990 election. Unsuccessfully, they launched a new “Party of Well-Being” but did not manage
to collect the sufficient number of signatures to run for the 1990 election. Not surprisingly,
given this unrest, support for the Progress Party dropped to 6.4 per cent in the 1990 election.
The next critical point came after the election in September 1994 when increasing
dissatisfaction with Pia Kjaersgaard’s strong leadership led to a succesful rebellion in the
parliamentary group and a prolonged state of civil war in the party. By October 6, 1995, Pia
Kjaersgaard along with three other MP’s broke with the Progress Party and launched the
Danish People’s Party. As it was Pia Kjaersgaard who represented the party’s new political
identity, her party was the one to survive. Due to the high personal popularity of Progress
Party leader Kirsten Jacobsen who won a great victory in her own constituency, the party
4survived the 1998 election. But by 2000 when Glistrup had been re-admitted membership of
the Progress Party against the will of the four MP’s, they collectively broke with the party and
did not seek reelection in 2001. Meanwhile, Glistrup captured control over his old party and
appeared in 2001 as ‘campaign leader’, but his charisma had gone and his overt racism was
far too extreme, even in an election only two months after the terrorist attacks in the USA.
Ironically, it became Glistrup’s own task to close down the party he had launched 29 years
earlier. The Progress Party barely received 0.6 per cent in the 2001 election., leaving the
Danish People’s Party as the only successor of the Progress Party. 
However, the Danish People’s Party is more than a successor; is also represents a
metamorphosis of the new right. With the formation of a new party came the opportunity to
get rid of the legacy of neoliberalism. Some elements were formally maintained in party
documents such as the working programme of 1998, but in practice, the new party abandoned
criticism of the welfare state and taxes, and increasingly argued in favour of improved
conditions  for pensioners. The party has presented itself as a nationalist, euro-sceptic, pro-
welfare, anti-immigration party seeking practical cooperation and compromise with other
parties. The party is highly centralised (with a very professional organisation at the central
level), and has frequently excluded members, e.g. members who fraternise with right-wing
extremism. However, even if Pia Kjaersgaard is a very strong and undisputed leader - the only
Danish party leader with a significant impact on support for the party that cannot be explained
by ideology (Andersen & Borre, 2003) - she is surrounded by a few skilled and relatively
young politicians who would be able to take over.
After the 2001 election, the party found itself in an ideal position. As the Liberal-
Conservative government was able to form a majority in parliament solely with the support of
the Danish People’s Party, and as the Liberals in particular have moved in the same direction,
the Danish People’s Party came to function as the governments’ parliamentary support in
nearly all major reforms, including a dramatic tightening of all sorts of rules for immigrants.
At the same time, it has been approached on several occasions by the trade unions lobbying
for the party’s support, and it has increasingly achieved an image as a pro-welfare party
usually aiming to get concessions on welfare issues, in particular for pensioners, from the
Liberal-Conservative government.
As pointed out below, the party has achieved a position as centrist on the traditional
left-right dimension but as extreme right on a new left-right dimension which has increasingly
come to dominate Danish politics, transforming even the other parties, in particular the
Liberals and the three small centre parties (Radical Liberals, Centre Democrats and Christian
Democrats), as well as the left wing which underwent a similar metamorphosis already in the
1970s to adjust to new “green” values. Due to the changing cleavage structure, socialist
parties have lost immense support among manual workers who are generally to the left on the
old left-right dimension (and in Denmark even on “green” issues which were captured by the
left wing in the 1970's) - but to the right on the value politics dimension. In the sense, the birth
of the New Right with the anti-tax Progress Party in 1973 was as premature as the birth of the
5new left with the advent of SF in 1960. Both parties had to be transformed, not in order to
opportunistically exploit new issues (Klages, 2002), but to adapt to changing cleavages. A
model of changing cleavage structures and cleavage mobilisation is presented briefly below.
2. A Cleavage Approach
This article analyses and interprets the emergence and transformation of the new right in
Denmark from the perspective of changing cleavage structures (Andersen & Bjørklund, 1990;
Borre, 1995; Andersen & Borre, 2003), roughly following the approach of Lipset & Rokkan
(1967), only applied to a changing society. From the 1920s to the 1960's, most Western
European party systems had been “frozen” as the conflicts of industrial society was already
fully mobilised. In spite of the growth of the new middle class which could blur class
divisions, there were no genuinely new conflicts in society that could be politically mobilized.
But with post-industrial society, and with globalization and Europeanization, this changed.
Political cleavages in Western Europe, according to Lipset & Rokkan (1967),
basically reflected the cultural or value conflicts related to the national revolution, and the
economic conflicts related to the industrial revolution (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). In Denmark,
the latter were wholly predominant, in particular the conflict between labour and capital. Like
elsewhere, the cleavage between urban and rural economy was losing importance. Conflict
was largely unidimensional, structured by the socioeconomic left-right dimension.
With postindustrialism a new conflict emerged, sometimes interpreted as a value
conflict rooted in increasing wealth, sometimes as a structurally based struggle against
industrialism. According to the former approach, physical security and increasing wealth (or
marginal utility considerations) leads to changing value priorities as people orient themselves
towards higher-order needs such as aesthetic needs and need for self-realisation  (Inglehart,
1990). According to a structural interpretation, environmentalism reflects growing
consciousness of the counter-productive accumulation of environmental problems related to
the logic of industrialism (Beck, 1986; Kumar, 1988; Andersen, 1990). Similarly, anti-
authoritarian values are related to the growth of network society and increasing recognition of
the counterproductivity of hierarchical or taylorist forms of organisation.
Postmaterialism contributes to explain the appearance of the “new left”. But it has
little to say about the emergence of the “new right”. It is postmaterialists vs. “the others”. If
there is a separate place for the “new right”, it is as a counter-reaction (Ignazi, 1992). An
alternative interpretation of postmaterialism (Flanagan, 19xx) which emphasise two different
dimensions, the “green” dimension and the authoritarian-libertarian one, is helpful as it allows 
the “new right” to be placed at the authoritarian pole of a new dimension. But it fails to
provide a satisfactory  explanation of why value change came about, and it fails to
conceptualise the most important issue of immigration. 
At this point, the notion of globalization and Europeanization provides an alternative.
Just as the national revolution - the building of the modern nation-state - involved cultural
1) At the same tim e, globalisatio n also mean s a liberalisation o f market force s, but this aspec t only
serves to reinfo rce old co nflicts between  left and right.
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conflicts (between centre and periphery, and between the state and the church), globalization,
or more specifically, immigration, involves multiculturalism and thus new potential conflicts
between cultures. Europeanization also involves a new kind of centre-periphery conflict.1
If the national revolution and the industrial revolution generated the political
cleavage structures of the 20th century, it is reasonable to expect that the post-national and
post-industrial revolutions will feed the cleavage structures of the 21st century; at the same
time, we would expect a transformation of existing parties in order to adapt. Parties may
change profoundly even if they nominally remain the same. It is within this framework we
interpret the new right and its electoral support in Denmark - as well as the changing profile of
the Liberals, the centre parties, and the new left (for a fuller elaboration of this perspective,
see Andersen & Borre, 2003).
It is a classic notion in Rokkan and Lipset (1967) that structurally determined
conflicts only form the “raw material” of political cleavages; the political consequences are
country-specific, depending on how conflicts are articulated and on which alliances are forged
by political leaders. For instance, environmental conflict in Denmark was virtually swallowed
by the general left-right conflict as the issue was “captured” by the new left and articulated in
the language of anti-capitalism rather than as an almost moral question of priorities between
the environment and economic growth. Thus, it is “natural” that conflicts over
postmaterialism (linked to postindustrialization) tend to combine with ethnic conflicts (linked
to globalization) or even with conflicts over Europeanization. Not because this is structurally
determined or logically unavoidable, but because it is a likely outcome of discursive practises
and political opportunity structures (Kitschelt, 1995). The emerging value political dimension
is broader and also absorbs the classiscal but much more narrow conflict between
authoritarian and libertarian values. 
This approach moves beyond the categories of postmaterialism or new politics.
(Andersen & Bjørklund; 1990; Borre 1995) which failed to include the globalisation
dimension(s). In our model, the new right is understood not simply as a counter-reaction to the
new left, but with the point of departure in the notions of nation and culture. 
Party competition is important for the mobilization of new cleavages. Due to the
open access structure in the Danish party system, new conflicts are easily mobilised, and party
competition becomes more intense. This means that the “conventional” right is less
conventional than it used to be: The value politics dimension made the Social Democrats
vulnerable to competition not only from the Danish People’s Party, but also from the Liberals.
As voters’ sentiments on these issues were very different from those of the Social Democratic
coalition government, and as these issues became ever more salient, the Liberal party
exploited the opportunity to mobilise on them (Andersen, 2003a). As these issues brought
Social Democrats under pressure and caused much internal disagreement, this in turn
generated substantial media attention which fuelled mobilization even further. In short, even
7though the emergence of new cleavages is structurally rooted, the timing and the strength of
such mobilization depend on self-reinforcing mechanisms of party competition.
This approach sees the Danish People’s Party as a phenomenon which, basically,
must be studied by the same approach as other parties. The party is assumed to be located
simply at one pole of a continuum. The difference becomes clear when it is confronted with
other approaches. Thus, one line of research points out the parties’ distinctiveness in terms of
populism, or in terms of protest. Another line of research sees the emergence of new right
parties as a symptom of marginalisation among groups who feel threatened by social change,
in particular by information society and globalisation. The approach here, by contrast, avoids
the notion of marginalisation and point at more enduring conflicts over culture. The common
line for many alternative approaches is that they see new right parties as symptoms of
something else. Below, we shall contrast some of these interpretations.
3. The changing political agenda in Denmark
It was dissatisfaction with rapidly increasing taxes under a bourgeois government that created
the basis for the Progress Party breakthrough in the early 1970's. At that time, taxes was also
the single most important issue at the voters’ agenda (table 2). Engagement in this issue soon
died out, however, when the economy and the employment situation worsened after the first
oil crisis. Even though taxation was given high priority by many of the parties - and by the
media - in 1990 and 2001, the saliency of this issue among voters remained rather low. In
2001, 15 per cent of the voters mentioned tax as an important issue (equivalent to 6 per cent
of all answers, as compared to 24 per cent in 1973). Among liberals and conservatives, as well
as among adherents of the new right, the proportion of respondents mentioning taxes was  21
and 20 per cent, respectively. Thus unlike the elections from 1973 to 1984 (Glans, 1984), high
issue saliency of taxes was no longer a distinctive characteristic of the new right in 2001.
[ table 2 goes here ]
When it comes to immigration, there are few signs that the degree of hostility
towards immigrants has worsened since the 1970s. But saliency of the issue has certainly
increased. Alongside this, party polarisation has also increased; by 1979, there was virtually
no party difference in attitudes towards immigrants among Danish voters; only a slightly
higher sympathy on the left wing was beginning to crystallize (Bjørklund & Andersen, 2002).
What brought the issue on the agenda, was the sudden shock of asylum-seeking refugees from
the mid-1980s. At that time, the issue only appeared as short-term flashes on the voters’
agenda, following newspaper headlines (Tonsgaard 1989; Togeby 1997:67), but from 1990,
the growing immigrant population and increasing public attention to the problems it entailed
put the issue permanently at the voters' agenda. By 1994, 8 per cent of the answers concerned
immigration, by 1998 it was 14 per cent and in 2001, the figure was 20 per cent. This means
that 35 per cent of all voters in 1998 and 51 per cent in 1998 mentioned immigration among
8the most important issues. Similar measurements between the elections provide proportions
in-between (Andersen, 2003a).
However, mentioning immigration as an important problem has long ago ceased
being equivalent to hostility against foreigners. In 2001, the issue was salient for all voters -
44 per cent among left wing voters, 43 per cent among social democrats, 46 per cent among
centre party voters, 51 per cent among liberals and conservatives, and 78 per cent among those
who voted for the Danish People’s Party or the Progress Party. There remains an association
between negative attitudes to foreigners and saliency of the issue, but it has become
increasingly weak; concern for integration or fear of racism are almost equally strong
determinants of issue saliency (Andersen, 2003a).
Still, taken together, welfare issues were more important on the voters’ agenda even
in 2001. Indeed, this year there were only two major types of issues on the voters’ agenda:
Immigration and welfare (among which health care and care for the elderly were the most
important). Among these issues, immigration was clearly the most divisive one. 
4. A right-wing party , but what kind of right wing?
The label of parties like the Danish People’s Party is frequently the subject of discussion.
Should they be labelled extreme right parties? And what is meant by extreme? Taking a point
of departure in people’s perceptions and identities, the label “extreme right” does not seem
entirely unwarranted (table 3). In fact, Danish voters do locate the Danish People’s Party to an
extreme right position (8.13 on a scale from 0 to 10, as against 7.32 for the Liberals). Even the
Danish People’s Party’s own voters locate their party further to the right than supporters of
any other parties (7.83, as against 7.47 for the Conservatives). Only the voters’ own position
deviate somewhat: Average self-placement for those who vote for the Danish People’s Party
is 6.91, as against 7.05 for conservative voters and 6.71 for liberal voters. Still, supporters of
the party clearly conceive of themselves as being to the right - but not extreme right.
[ table 3 goes here ]
However, this partly reflects the changing meaning of left and right (Goul Andersen, 1993;
Kitschelt, 1995). Traditionally, being to the right meant being to the right on a socioeconomic
left-right dimension, but increasingly, left-right identity reflects both position on a
socioeconomic and a value dimension, and by 2001, position on the latter dimension even
appeared to be slightly more important for people’s left-right identities than position on the
former (Andersen, 2003a). Thus, Danish People’s Party voters conceive themselves and their
party to be far to the right because it is far to the right on the value dimension.
Indeed, Danish People’s Party voters are very far to the right on the value dimension.
This holds especially for immigration, but also for other issues on this dimension among
2) Questions concerning the environment are actually twodimensional in Denmark as they load both on a
traditional left-right d imension an d on a value  politics dimen sion. As men tioned, this reflec ts the left
wing  mob ilisation on such  issues in the 197 0s.
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which the most important are support for developmental aid, law and order and environment2
(table 4). There is a huge distance between the Danish People’s Party voters and
Liberal/Conservative voters when it comes to considering immigrants a threat to Danish
culture. As measured by the balance of opinion (disagree minus agree, in percentages), the
difference is almost equivalent to the difference between the Conservatives and Liberals, on
the one hand, and left wing voters on the other. At the same time we note a marked difference
between the left wing and centre party supporters on the one hand, and social democrats at the
other. As many Social Democrats hostile to immigration had left the party in 2001, those who
remained loyal were even more positive to immigration that social democrats had used to be.
[table 4 goes here]
The same relationship is found when it comes to aid to developing countries, law and order,
and environmental attitudes. The main difference is that Social Democrats are among the
progressives when we speak of the environment, and that the differences between Danish
Peoples Party voters and Liberal/Conservative voters on these issues are much more modest.
A completely different pattern is found when we look at old left-right issues (table 5).
Here, we find the well-known ordering of left wing, social democrats, and adherents of the
centre parties. But the Danish People’s Party does not fit in as an extreme right party. To
begin with pensions and health care - where the legacy for favouring more spending stretches
back even to the Progress Party - we find Danish People’s Party voters as those who most
unanimously favour increasing expenditures, even in comparison with social democrats and
left wing voters. However, on these two expenditure issues, there is little party polarisation at
all. On other issues, adherents of Danish People’s Party voters come out as belonging to the
right-of-centre group of voters. Unlike liberals and conservatives, most of these voters deny
that social reforms have gone too far,  but the majority is small and well away from the figures
of the centre parties. This holds even more when it comes to choosing between tax relief and
more welfare where Danish People’s Party voters and conservative/liberal voters are quite
similar. 
[ table 5 goes here ]
The same holds for attitudes towards state control whereas economic equality is
evaluated more positively among Danish People’s Party voters than among other voters to the
right - here, the proportion favouring equality is at the same level as centre party voters.
Borre (2003) has combined similar information into two indexes that serve to locate
all parties on a socioeconomic and value political left-right dimension, respectively (table 6).
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As evidenced by the table, Danish People’s Party voters are obviously to the right on new
politics, but closer to the centre on old politics.
[ table 6 goes here ]
Finally, there is a marked difference between the Danish People’s Party and the traditional
right parties in attitudes to the EU. In a Danish context, EU is a multidimensional item which
originally represented “more market and less state” and fitted well into the traditional left-
right dimension. Increasingly, the market liberalisation aspect has become more ambiguous
while other aspects have become more pertinent. Mogens Glistrup has always remained loyal
to the EU whereas Pia Kjaersgaard and her party has taken a more critical stance, opposing
further integration. 
The voting patterns in the six Danish EU referenda clearly show a restructuring of
attitudes, even though the new left remains overwhelmingly opposed to further integration and
the social democratic voters - unlike their leaders - are sceptical. In the first referendum in
1972, voting patterns closely followed the left-right scale, with 97 per cent voting yes among
liberals, 89 per cent among conservatives, and 17 per cent among those supporting the
Socialist People’s Party. In the 2000 referendum over Danish inclusion in the Economic and
Monetary Union (where a majority voted no), the proportion voting yes among Socialist
People’s Party voters had increased to 25 per cent, whereas it had dropped from 97 to 63 per
cent among liberals. Among most other parties, there was a decline in yes-votes roughly
corresponding with the average difference between the two referenda. Among Danish
People’s Party voters, however, only 16 per cent voted yes in 2000 (Andersen, 2003b: 88).
This is different from the Progress Party. Thus in 1986, 63 per cent of Progress Party
adherents voted yes, and as late as in 1993, the proportion was 45 per cent. Likewise, in the
eyes of the voters, but contrary to the party’s official position as being only “sceptical”, the
Danish People’s Party is considered the most negative towards EU among all parties. Nothing
indicates that this issue is very important to the party’s voters. But it is obvious that the party
has adjusted its position and has been more than followed by its voters.
The figures for old and new left-right position above are. in a nutshell, the
explanation of the emergence and support of the Danish People’s Party: The party has
contributed to mobilize on value politics. It does not have an issue ownership any more, but it
takes an extreme stand. At the same time, it is not a single issue party: There is consistence
across issues just as on the old left-right dimension, and more importantly: These issues are of
great concern to all voters and serve to divide the parties in other ways than previously.
5. Social differences
As voters increasing vote rationally in accordance with their attitudes - a phenomenon usually
called issue voting even though this unintentionally tend to connote short term issues - the
3) The co ntext is comp letely different, of co urse, and it was q uite different asp ects of cultural ca pital -
interpreted from a power perspective - that was emphasised by Bourdieu.
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patterns described above should have an impact on social patterns of voting. Attitudes towards
value politics are very strongly determined by education. This means that education has
increasingly become a sort of two dimensional variable - a bit parallel to Bourdieu’s (1986)
classical distinction between economic and cultural capital3. Education determines market
position which other things being equal draws to the right. But on the other hand, education
breeds liberal and tolerant values which normally pull to the left, or at least to the centre
parties specialising on leftist positions on this dimension. 
Likewise, mainly because of its correlation with education, class pulls in different
directions. Working class persons are pulled to the left on socioeconomic left-right issues, but
to the right on value politics. The result is that over a 35 year period from 1966 to 2001,
working class support for Socialist parties was nearly halved, from 81 to 41 per cent - whereas
the voting pattern of other groups remained almost unaffected (Andersen & Andersen, 2003).
What was lost for the socialists among lower-level white collar workers, was won among the
upper levels.
For the new right parties, this development means that they have become the most
clean-cut labour parties. It is quite interesting to follow the development (table 7). In the
1960's, the social composition of the left wing was almost the same as the social composition
of social democratic supporters. But this changed rapidly and markedly in the 1970's when the
proportion of workers of the left wing parties declined to about average. Blue-collar workers
were not exactly hostile to the values of the new left, but nor were they strongly attracted,
unlike new middle class groups with higher education.. 
[ table 7 goes here ]
Around the Progress Party’s breakthrough in 1973, the party was remarkable by having less
under-representation of workers than any other non-socialist party. Since then, the social
composition of the voters of the Progress Party and the Danish People’s party has changed
further, however. Increasingly, workers have become over-represented. In the the late 1980s,
this over-representation reached the same level as among the social democrats. And since
1994, the proportion of workers among Danish People’s Party’s voters has even climbed well
above that of the social democrats. At the same time, the proportion of workers on the left
wing has declined even more, to a level even below the non-socialist parties excluding the
new right parties.
Another significant aspect is the majority of men among the Danish People’s Party’s
supporters. As there is much less difference in attitudes, and as women vote further to the left
than men, this actually means that women tend to be the “hardliners”on value politics within
most parties. As far as age is concerned, there is a constant over-representation among the old,
whereas the support among young people to some extent follow the ups and downs of the
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party. However, the party has a stronghold among young males with working-class
backgrounds or with low education (table 8).
[ table 8 goes here ]
6. Marginalisation and alienation?
It has become a widespread assumption that support for the new right is an effect of processes
of marginalisation related to the transition to post-industrialism and globalisation (Betz,
1994). This provides the most potent alternative explanation to the cleavage approach. And it
is obvious to parallelize to the “extremism of the centre” or the middle class which was
feeding fascism in the interwar period (Lipset, 1960). However, like the theory of fascism, the
marginalisation theory is difficult to test. The premises are largely wrong, however. 
To begin with macro level observations, we may note that during mass
unemployment in the 1980's, support for the Progress Party was at a low, whereas it increased
in the 1990's when Denmark experienced the largest drop in unemployment rates since the
1950's, most strongly for people with low education (Jensen, 2003). Also at the individual
level, there is no indication that labour market  marginalisation or exclusion increases support
for the new right. We do find in 2001, however, that support for the Danish People’s Party is
larger among those unemployed than among the employed. But most of this is a simple effect
of class composition (table 9). Among workers, there is no difference at all between employed
and unemployed. Among white collars, there is such a difference, but this mainly reflects
differences in educational composition between the employed and unemployed. The same
applies to those disablement pensioners and others below the age of 60 who are entirely
outside the labour market.
[ table 9 goes here ]
When it comes to other indications of marginalisation, the evidence is a little more
ambiguous. But not much. There are slightly higher proportions among Danish People’s Party
voters who have personally experienced an economic downturn during the years preceding the
2001 election. There are also slightly higher proportions who hold a pessimistic view about
the future. And there is a slightly higher proportion who are not acquainted with the use of
new information technology. But the differences typically amount to less than 10 percentage
points and are too small to be really important (Meret, 2003; Andersen, 2000). As far as
income is concerned, Danish People Party  voters are certainly at the lower end. But this
largely reflects the social composition, and the proportion of homeowners is about average
(Andersen & Andersen, 2003).
The Danish People’s Party does combine strongle negative attitudes towards
foreigners and towards the EU, but generally speaking, these attitudes are weakly
interconnected in the Danish population, although the association seems to be strengthening
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somewhat over time (Andersen, 2003b). By the same token, Danish People’s Party voters are
among the most isolationist in the Danish population - but again with small differences to the
other parties (Tobiasen, 2003). 
Not surprisingly, the Danish People’s Party’s  voters are characterised by relatively
low trust in politicians. And it is noteworthy that the Danish People’s Party’s MP’s have the
habit of referring to politicians as “they” rather than as “we”. Definitely, there is a notion of
the “people against the elites”. But similar distrust is found on the left wing, and the relative
strength of distrust depend strongly on the colour and on the practises of the government
currently in office. In short, distrust reflect policy distance to the government. More
interestingly, Danish People’s Party voters also reveal unusually low level of social trust,
which does seem to indicate that persons with specific psychological and sociological
characteristics are attracted by the party (Meret, 2003).
Despite such differences, however, the overwhelming conclusion is that Danish
People’s Party voters are rather similar to others. But they do hold different political attitudes
which determine their choice of party. People know what they are doing, and voting for the
party does not seem to reflect unconscious resentment, projection of frustrations, or the like. 
7. Delicate balances and possible futures
The encompassing political mobilization on the value political dimension in Denmark
contributes on the one hand to focus public debates on those issues on which the Danish
People’s Party thrives. On the other hand, it also means strong competition. Previously, the
party could demand unspecified tightening of rules for immigration or more law and order. By
2003, other parties have the same demands - or rules have already been tightened to a degree
where it is impossible going much further without violating international conventions on
human rights, or for purely practical reasons. Further, the proportion of the voters who want to
go any further declines; after all, sentiments towards immigrants are not by any means
unambiguously negative in Denmark (Gaasholt & Togeby, 1995; Togeby, 1997; Andersen,
2002)..
This means that the party’s room of manoeuvre has been narrowed. On the one hand,
the Danish People’s Party has to make claims that make it possible for voters to distinguish
the party from the government in office. On the other hand, the party cannot go too far without
being considered extremist. And finally, in order to maintain its privileged parliamentary
situation as the governments main coalition partner, it has to abstain from too populist actions
that would make the party less “respectable”, as was the case with the Progress Party in the
1970s and 1980s.
This is not an impossible situation, and the party can always rely on some
percentages of xenophobic or outright racist core voters. But those are a minority. It means
that the party has to strike delicate balances which is not always easy. When the party had its
founding meeting in 1996, the nationalist strings were definitely hit too hard and brought
associations of fascist hyper-nationalism. In 1999, Pia Kjaersgaard uttered that the whole
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family should be sent out of the country if a young family member broke the law seriously. In
2003, the party has also taken some populist stands which does threaten to undermine the
party’s position. The background was a Danish Supreme Court decision where Pia
Kjaersgaard’s charge against a person accusing her of racism was rejected. The Supreme
Court found that, given the statements of Pia Kjaersgaard, and given the broadening of the
usage of the term “racism” in the general population, the accusation could not be considered
entirely unjustified. Pia Kjaersgaard reacted by accusing the Supreme Court of having made a
“political” decision - a statement which was obviously not welcomed by the governing parties.
Pia Kjaersgaard had also some difficulties in explaining a statement that she did not consider
international conventions of human rights an insurmountable obstacle to making different
rules for people bringing their spouse to Denmark, depending on ethnicity. In the end, she
specified, however, that the party did not want to violate the conventions.
Finally, also the cooperation between the trade unions and the party (which lent
legitimacy to the party, in return for influence to the unions) has been interrupted by June/July
2003 because the Danish TUC leader, Hans Jensen, stated that the cooperation with the party
was highly involuntary, dictated only by the political circumstances. This offended the
leadership of the Danish People’s Party who invited Hans Jensen to morning coffee to explain
what he meant. As he refused - in a not very polite letter - the party declared that it did not
want any further cooperation with the unions.
Such newspaper headlines are probably not very beneficial for the party. At the same
time, it seems likely that the tightening of rules adopted in 2002 will serve to reduce the
saliency of the issue of immigration. The people got what it wanted, so to speak, and there is
little more in terms of tightening that could possibly be done. Most likely, the value dimension
will play a smaller role in the next elections, and this is likely to reduce support for the party
somewhat. On the other hand, there is any reason to believe that the new value cleavage,
including the issue of immigration and multiculturalism, will be an enduring one in Danish
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Table 1. Electoral support for the Progress Party and the Danish People's Party, 1973-
2001. Percentages.

















Table 2. The political agenda of Danish voters, 1971-2001. Percentages of all answers. 
1971 1973 1975 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001
1.Unemployment 3 1 40 42 23 44
 } 63
16 13 29 24 7 3
2.Economic problems 24 17 32 29 51 28 31 24 19 15 7 4
3.Taxes 12 24 6 4 5 6 4 2 7 9 2 5 6
1-3.Econ-issues total 39 42 78 75 79 78 67 49 44 57 41 19 13
4.Environment 8 4 1 3 6 2 3 15 9 10 8 9 4
5.Welfare 26 14 4 13 7 8 13 15 6 20 38 47 51
6.Immigration - - - - - - - 4 2 4 8 14 20
7.Foreign/defence pol. 17 3 1 1 1 2 9 3 15 3 3 5 4
8.Else 10 37 16 8 7 10 8 14 24 6 2 61) 81)
I alt 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Q. "Now I would like to ask wh ich problems you c onsider most im portant toda y for politicians to take care of? 
Table shows distribution of all answers. Average number of answers was 2.5 in 2001, 2.4 in 1998, falling to a little below 2.0 answers in the 1970s.
1) Of which: Law and order:  3 per cent. in 1998, 2 per cent in  2001.
Source: Election surveys (1994: Thomsen (1995)). 
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Table 3. Voters’ placement of all parties on a left-right scale, placement of own party, and










Ø.Unity list 1.47 1.14 1.53
F.Socialist P eople’s P arty 2.78 2.70 2.97
A.Social D emocrats 4.38 4.57 4.26
B.Rad ical Liberals 4.61 4.66 4.62
Q.Christian  Demo crats 5.48 5.81 5.54
C.Conservatives 6.98 7.47 7.05
V.Libera ls 7.32 7.42 6.71
O.Dan ish Peop le’s Party 8.13 7.83 6.91
Table 4. Attitudes towards value politics issues, 2001.
Percentage difference (pos.=overweight to the leftist attitude ).
Immigration














Danish People’s Party -70 -73 -80 0 210
Cons./Lib. -6 -53 -63 +6 815
Centre  Parties +64 +10 +18 +63 165
Social Dem. +14 -15 -13 +47 518
Left Wing +74 +22 +46 +83 171
Table 5. Attitudes towards old politics issues, 2001.
























Danish People’s Party 65 77 12 -20 1 -41 210
Cons./Lib. 40 66 -8 -25 -26 -56 815
Centre Parties 29 59 40 25 -2 -8 165
Social Dem. 47 69 55 41 35 11 518
Left wing 49 69 77 67 62 41 171
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Table 6. Position on new and old politics index, 2001.
old politics value politics
Unitary List 1.90 1.91
Socialist Pe oples Pa rty 2.00 2.52
Social D emocrats 2.43 3.18
Radical L iberals 2.91 2.39
Christian D emocrats 3.12 3.01
Conservatives 3.78 3.56
Liberals 3.59 3.70
Danish P eoples P arty 3.19 4.15
Source: Borre (2003)
Table 7. Proportion of workers among the supporters of various party groups. Deviations
from sample means. Percentage points.
1966 1973 1977 1979 1981 1984 1987 1988 1990 1994 1998 2001
Progress Party/DPP -4 -1 +2 +6 +9 +4 +14 +15 +16 +13 +21
Other bourg. part. -26 -15 -20 -17 -15 -12 -12 -15 -16 -11 -10 -8
Social demcr. part. +27 +26 +20 +15 +18 +20 +19 +16 +16 +13 +9 +8
Left Wing +26 +17 +6 +3 +4 0 +2 +4 +1 -3 -3 -9
Normal       40 37 35 36 36 32 32 36 31 34 38 35
Source: B jørklund &  Anderse n (2002 ). Election sur veys, Danish E lection Pro gramme. 
Note. Entries are deviations between the proportion of manual workers among the supporters of various
party groups and in the entire sample ("normal"). Only voters belonging to the labour force are
included (1966 including housewives classified according to husband's position but this does not affect
the figures significantly).
Table 8. Support for the Progress Party/Danish Peoples's Party (combined support), by age,
gender and class, 2001. Percentages.
Workers White collar
men women men women
18-29 years 23 15 7 7
30-39 years 22 17 6 6
40 years or more 17 14 9 7
(N) 894 581 472 660
1100 834 1143 1695
2351 1488 2577 2934
Source: Danish E lection Stud ies; 2001 :  AIM teleb us, jan-aug.20 02. 
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Table 9. Support for the Progress Party/Danish Peoples's Party (combined support), by
labour market status, 1987-2001. Percentages.
1987 1990 1994 1998 2001
Employed 5 7 6 5 12
Unemployed 7 6 6 10 15
Disablement pensioners and
others (18-59 years)
2 7 6 12 16
(N) 1905 1508 1885 2064 17334
156 183 229 174 748
98 122 165 197 1034
Source: Danish E lection Stud ies; 2001 :  AIM teleb us, jan-aug.20 02. 
Table 10. Support for the Progress Party/Danish Peoples's Party (combined support), by
labour market status and class, 2001. Percentages.
employed unemployed
manual workers 18 17
nonmanual employees 7 15
N 6916 336
9247 235
